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Williams: A Guiding Light: Safety Harbor

A Guiding Light: Safety Harbor
In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa 456 B.R. 703
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)
by Nicholas E. Williams
1

' ' T h e sky is falling! The skyisfalling!" Oris it? Today, courts
across the country face a difficult task in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision regarding bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction, Stern v. Marshall. 2 Stern held bankruptcy courts
are constitutionally proscribed from entering final judgment based
on a private, state-law counterclaim "that is not resolved in the
process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim." 3 A bankruptcy
court must now consider Stern when a litigant objects to the court's
authority. With over 3,000 adversary proceedings pending in the
Middle District of Florida for the month of July 2012 alone, 4 Stern

Nicholas E. Williams received his JD in 2013 from the University of Miami
School of Law. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do
not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. courts, its judicial officers, or the
University of Miami, it faculty, staff, or employees.
CHICKEN LITTLE (Walt Disney Pictures 2005); see In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.,
1
462 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) ("Since [Stern's] release, a maelstrom
of opinions and articles have been written about the scope of Stern, ranging in
tone from 'much ado about nothing' to 'the end of the bankruptcy world as we
know it."'); see also In re Teleservices Grp., Inc. , 456 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011) ("[B]ombshell does fairly describe Stern's impact upon the more
practical issue of how bankruptcy judges are to perform what the [bankruptcy]
[c]ode still calls us to do.")
2
131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
3
See id. at 2620.
4
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, Statistics
for the Middle District of Florida Quly 2012), http: / / www.flmb.uscourts.gov/
statistics/ 2012/ july. pdf.
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could notably impact how districts manage bankruptcy cases. A
broad reading of Stern could mean many bankruptcy matters must
be added to the already crowded district courts' dockets, while a
narrow reading will only minimally affect the current division of
labor.
In In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 5 the Honorable Michael
G. Williamson 6 analyzed Stern and provided a guiding light in our
common law. This Comment examines Safety Harbor, preliminarily
to provide its factual background. In order to explicate the Safety
Harbor decision, this Comment then reviews the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority
and the modern bankruptcy code ("the Code"). Thereafter, this
Comment provides a summary of Safety Harbor and an analysis of its
interpretation of Stern.

Factual Background: Setting Up Safety Harbor
Before filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, the would-be
debtor, Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, LLC (SHS), obtained a loan
from Wells Fargo Bank. 7 The debtor's parent company, Olympia
Development Group (Olympia), guaranteed the loan. 8 Subsequent
to SHS's Chapter 11 filing, Wells Fargo Bank sold the SHS loan
to German American. 9 The loan included a $13.8 million secured
claim and a $15.9 million unsecured claim. 10 In bankruptcy,
SHS proposed a reorganization plan requesting that Olympia be
released from the guaranty in exchange for contributing substantial
assets deemed necessary for the debtor's reorganization. 11 SHS
proposed to satisfy German American's claim through (1) a $3
million contribution from Olympia, (2) the sale of land, and (3)
the restructuring of the loan. 12
5
6

7
8

9
10
11
12

456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
The Honorable Michael G. Williamson has served as a bankruptcy judge in the
Middle District of Florida since his appointment in 2000. 1 ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERALJUDICIARY, 11th Circuit, at 64 (Megan Rosen ed., 2012). Before that
Judge Williamson practiced with Kay, Gronek & Latham. Id. Judge Williamson
graduated from Duke University in 1973 and from the Georgetown University
Law Center in 1976. Id.
Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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German American objected to the plan, specifically Olympia's
release, and moved the court to impose "lock-up" restrictions 13 on
Olympia and the reorganized SHS in order to protect the value
of the loan's balance. 14 In lieu of generally releasing Olympia
from its guaranty, the court enjoined German American from
pursuing Olympia for four years. 15 As part of confirming the plan,
Judge Williamson imposed the "lock-up" restrictions on SHS and
Olympia.16 SHS objected on the basis of Stern v. Marshall and claimed
the bankruptcy court did not have the constitutional authority
to impose "lock-up" restrictions on Olympia. 17 Accordingly,
to determine whether the court could impose the "lock-up"
restrictions on Olympia, Judge Williamson had to "review[] the
Stern decision." 18
Ultimately, Judge Williamson held bankruptcy courts'
constitutional authority to impose "lock-up" restrictions was not
affected by Stern v. Marshall19 and "lock-up" restrictions were
integral to confirming Safety Harbor's plan. 20
A Brief History: Bankruptcy Courts Under Scrutiny
The United States Supreme Court has twice invalidated
bankruptcy courts' power to enter final judgment in certain civil
actions.
As Article I states, bankruptcy courts cannot constitutionally
enter final judgment on the basis of a state-law claim against a non-

13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20

"Lock-up" restrictions are restrictions on a reorganized debtor's post-confirmation
behavior. In this case, the creditor suggested that the debtor and its parent
company be prohibited from the following: "(i) issuing additional equity interests
to anyone other than the non-debtor guarantors; (ii) borrowing any additional
funds; (iii) transferring or encumbering their equity interests in the [d]ebtor; (iv)
materially changing their management personnel or the business in which they
are engaged; or (v) purchasing other companies." Id. at 707.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706-07.
Id. at 705.
See id.
Id. at 707.
Congress vested bankruptcy courts with the power to "hear and determine .. .
all core proceedings ... and ... enter appropriate orders and judgments ... "
28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1) (2006). Congress also provided an illustrative list of
core proceedings, including "matters concerning the administration of the
estate" and "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate."§ 157(b)(2).
Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 719.
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consenting party. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., the Supreme Court decided whether the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 conferred jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts beyond that
allowed to non-Article III courts. 21 A Chapter 11 debtor brought
suit against another company on the basis of a state-law claim. 22 The
Supreme Court held that allowing a bankruptcy court to adjudicate
those claims violated the doctrine of separation of powers. 23 The
plurality opinion 24 explained that the Constitution requires that
federal judicial power be held in an independent judiciary, defined
as judges guarded by the protections enumerated in Article III. 25 The
plurality rejected the claims that bankruptcy courts are territorial
courts, military courts, or adjuncts of the district courts. 26 Implying
that bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority derives from the
"public rights" nature of the claims those courts adjudicate, the
opinion posited that discharging debts "may well be a 'public right,"'
but adjudicating private, state-law claims "obviously is not." 27 While
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's concurrence 28 did not agree that
reaching the 1978 Bankruptcy Act was necessary, 29 his analysis was
similar to the plurality's. Thus six justices agreed on the conclusion
that a bankruptcy court cannot adjudicate purely state-law claims
(without the defendant's consent).
In 1984, Congress amended the Code to ameliorate the
constitutional problems announced in Northern Pipeline. 30 Although
21

22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29

30

458 U.S. 50, 52 (1982) (plurality opinion). After deciding that the bankruptcy
court could not hear the state-law claim, the Court analyzed whether the rule
should be applied retroactively. Id. at 87-89. Because it is not relevant to the
discussion of Safety Harbor, the retroactivity analysis is not addressed in this
Comment.
The state-law claims included, inter alia, a breach of contract claim. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 56.
See id. at 87; see also id. at 91-92 (concurring in the judgment) .
The plurality was authored byJustice Brennan and joined byJustices Blackmun ,
Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 51.
Id. at 57-60. Article III requires that judges enjoy lifetime appointment during
"good behavior" and protection of their compensation from diminution. U.S.
Co ST. art. III,§ 1.
See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at64-67, 77-83 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 71.
Justice O 'Connor joined the concurrence. Id. at 89 (concurring in the
judgment).
Because the filing of the suit was not part of the bankruptcy action, the
bankruptcy court is not exercising power given to it by the 1978 Bankruptcy
Act. See id. at 89-90 (Rehnquist, CJ.).
In 1984, Congress amended the Code and created the modern jurisdiction
of bankruptcy courts. District courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction
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many expected the Court to decide the constitutionality of these
changes in Granjinanciera v. Nordberg, the Supreme Court passed on
- that broad question. 31
Almost twenty-five years after Northern Pipeline, a widow alleged
her husband's son tortiously interfered with her husband's will,
and she filed suit in a Texas probate court. 32 Before the tortious
interference claim was decided in Texas, the widow filed for
bankruptcy. 33 In Stern v. Marshall, the son filed a proof of claim and
a defamation suit in the bankruptcy court. 34 The widow filed her
counterclaim to the defamation action in the bankruptcy court,
and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the widow
in both suits. 35 The son appealed, challenging the bankruptcy
court's authority to adjudicate the widow's counterclaim. 36
According to Stern, the bankruptcy court had statutory but
not constitutional authority to adjudicate the counterclaim at
issue. 37 Congress specifically enumerated counterclaims brought
by the estate as "core proceedings" that the bankruptcy court has
authority to hear. 38 However, the Court also analyzed whether
the bankruptcy court had constitutional authority to hear the
counterclaim. 39 The Court analogized the counterclaim at issue
in Stern to the claim at issue in Northern Pipeline. 40 As in Northern
Pipeline, the Stern Court explored the possibilities that could allow

31

32
33
34
35
36
37

38
39
40

over all cases under title 11 of the Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006). The
district courts may refer cases to the bankruptcy judges in the district. § 157 (a).
Bankruptcyjudges are appointed by the United States Courts of Appeals. § 152 (a)
(1). For more information regarding the jurisprudential and legislative history
of the Code, see generally ELIZABETH WARRE & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 104-05 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009)
(summarizing the development of the modern bankruptcy code).
In Granfinanciera, the "sole issue . . . is whether the Seventh Amendment
confers on [a person who did not submit a claim against but was sued by the
bankruptcy estate for a fraudulent conveyance] a right to a jury trial in the
face of Congress' decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate the
claims against them." 492 U.S. 33, 36, 50 (1989).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
"Core proceedings" always arise under Title 11 or in a Title 11 proceeding, and
28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) specifically enumerates the counterclaims brought by
the estate. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604-05; see also supra note 19.
See 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(2) (C) (2006); see also Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2404-05.
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2404-05.
See id. at 2609-11.
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the bankruptcy court to adjudicate the claim. The Court noted
that the claims at issue were not "public rights." 41 Additionally,
·the Court reasoned that bankruptcy courts are neither "adjuncts"
of the district courts 42 nor part of an agency scheme. 43 In Stern
and Northern Pipeline, both claims were state-law claims brought
against parties that did not consent to the court's jurisdiction over
the claim. 44 Concluding that adjudicating those claims required
judicial power that Congress improperly bestowed on a non-Article
III court, the Court held that the bankruptcy court did not have
constitutional authority to enter finaljudgment. 45
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented 46 and warned of the potential
practical consequences of the majority's decision:
Because the volume of bankruptcy cases is staggering ... a
constitutionally required game of jurisdictional ping-pong
between courts would lead to inefficiency, increased cost,
delay, and needless additional suffering .... 47
The majority answered the dissent's concerns: "[W] e are not
convinced that the practical consequences ... are as significant as
[the debtor] and the dissent suggest." 48 The majority asserted that the
Code already prohibits the bankruptcy courts from exceeding their
constitutional authority. 49 Further, its holding did not "meaningfully

41
42

43

44
45
46
47
48
49

See id. at2611-15; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at67-71 (plurality opinion);
Northern Pipeline, 458 U .S. at 91 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618-19; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-64,
81-86 (plurality opinion); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-71 (plurality
opinion); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89-91 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in
the judgment).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
See id.; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion); id. at 91-92
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
Joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia M. Sotomayor, and Elena
Kagan. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
Id. at 2630.
Id. at 2619 (majority opinion).
Specifically, the opinion refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2006), which provides
that bankruptcy courts may abstain from certain claims related to state law. Id.
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (1) (2006) requires district courts to review
de novo, prior to entering final judgment, matters "related to" bankruptcy
proceedings. Id. at 2620.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/14

6

Williams: A Guiding Light: Safety Harbor

SAFETY HARBOR

307

change[] the division of labor in the current statute" because the
issue in Stern was "narrow" and Congress only exceeded its authority
in "one isolated respect." 50 Whatever the scope of the opinion, Stern
must be considered to determine the constitutional relationship
between bankruptcy courts and district courts.
Presently, district courts have original jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases and proceedings, 51 but district courts may refer
those cases and proceedings to bankruptcy courts. 52 After referral,
bankruptcy judges may enter final orders in "core proceedings" 53
but still must submit "proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court" for review in "non-core proceedings. "54
Parties may appeal bankruptcy orders, both interlocutory and final,
to the district courts. 55 The way courts interpret Stern v. Marshall
will shape the future of modem bankruptcy proceedings.
A Summary of Stern: The Safety Harbor Decision
Safety Harbor set forth an accurate, narrow reading of Stern v.
Marshall, holding that the bankruptcy court had the constitutional
authority to impose "lock-up" restrictions on Olympia as part of
confirming SHS's plan. 56 Exhibiting sound interpretation and
jurisprudence, Safety Harbor argued that the Stern decision did not
alter bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority regarding "core
proceedings" not at issue in Stern. 57
In his analysis, Judge Williamson briefly restated the Supreme
Court's declaration that Article III of the Constitution prohibits
Congress from giving bankruptcy courts the jurisdiction of Article
III courts. 58 Then, he recounted the Supreme Court's discussion of
Northern Pipeline and the applicability of the "public-rights" exception
for non-Article III courts. 59 Judge Williamson also reviewed Stern's
rejection of the following arguments: ( 1) the counterclaim in Stern is
50
51
52
53
54
55

56
57
58
59

Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
See Id.§ 157(a).
See§ 157(b) (1).
See§ 157(c) (1).
See Id. § 158(a). While some bankruptcy orders may be appealed directly to
the courts of appeals, see id., this practice is not as common as appeals to the
district courts.
In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id.; see also infra section IV.
Safety Harborat 710-11.
See id. at 711.
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a "public right," (2) the filing of a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
court impliedly consents to the adjudication of related counterclaims,
.and (3) the bankruptcy courts are adjuncts of the district courts. 60
After that, Judge Williamson analyzed Stern's holding and
scope. 61 According to Judge Williamson, Stern held, "the bankruptcy
court lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment
on a state-law claim that was not resolved in the process of ruling on
a creditor's proof of claim." 62 Thrice quoting language from Stern for
support, he explained that Stern's holding was "narrow," and it will
not '"meaningfully change' the division of labor under section 157"
because "Congress only exceeded the limits of Article III in 'one
isolated respect. "' 63 Judge Williamson pointed out that not even all
state-law counterclaims were removed from the realm of bankruptcy
courts. 64 The bankruptcy courts may still hear counterclaims
that either stem from bankruptcy law itself or leave nothing to be
adjudicated once the proof of claim has been decided. 65 In fact,
"nothing in [Stern] actually limits a bankruptcy court's authority to
adjudicate other 'core proceedings' identified in section 157(b)
(2) ." 66 Further supporting its position, the court asserted that Stem
did not limit bankruptcy courts' authority to adjudicate any "core
proceeding," except those listed under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (C). 67
Judge Williamson's Safety Harbor opinion provided a well-reasoned
argument that Stern should be read narrowly.
Prudent Jurisprudence: Safety Harbors Narrow Reading of Stern

Judge Williamson's early reading of Stern is demonstrably
prudent. While Stern may be viably interpreted both broadly
and narrowly, numerous courts have agreed with Safety Harbors
interpretation. 68 Some districts, including the Middle District of
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

68

See id.
See id. at 715.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Quigley Co ., 676 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enjoin the debtor and its parent company
from taking action on certain pending litigation ); In re Appalachian Fuels,
LLC, 472 B.R. 731 , 739-41 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (citing Safety Harbor repeatedly and
approvingly) .
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Florida, have adjusted local procedures in light of Stern's fallout.
Moreover, reading Stern broadly could prevent meaningful
appellate review.
In the wake of Stern v. Marshall, bankruptcy and district judges
alike must decipher the impact of the decision on the constitutional
authority of bankruptcy courts to decide "core proceedings."
Challenges based on Stern will be raised through objections in
bankruptcy courts and motions to withdraw reference in district
courts. The breadth of Stern's application will determine the depth
of its consequences.
Stern's holding is inconsistent with its analysis, so courts
disagree on the scope of the majority's opinion. 69 The rationale
in Stern was broad 70 because the Court distilled years of Supreme
Court precedent into a number of considerations relevant to the
bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority. 71 These cases draw
from several substantive contexts, illustrating the potentially
broad application of the constitutional authority analysis. 72
However, narrow interpretations of the Supreme Court's holding
are justifiable because the majority in Stern explicitly limited the
decision's application. 73 Furthermore, the majority did not even
invalidate the relevant subsection of§ 157. 74 In fact, the majority

69

70

71

72

73
74

Compare In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 320 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2011) (holding the bankruptcy court did not have constitutional authority to
enter final judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action after analyzing Stern
among other cases), with In re Bujak, No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038,
at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011) (holding the bankruptcy court did have
constitutional authority to hear fraudulent conveyance actions after analyzing
Stern).
George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Acts
Summary/P!Amary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 NORTON J. BAN KR. L. &
PRAC., 1, 9 (2012).
See Stern v. Marshal4 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609-13 (2011) (citing, inter alia, Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932)).
In Murray's Lessee, the solicitor of the treasury issued a distress warrant. See 59
U.S. at 274. In Northern Pipeline, a bankruptcy judge entered final judgment
for a debtor's state-law claim. See 458 U.S. at 50-57. In Crowel4 a deputy
commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission
ruled on an employee's claim against his employer. See285 U.S. at 36.
See supra notes 49-51, 65, and accompanying text.
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619-20 (discussing the limited circumstances where
28 U.S.C § 157(b) (2) (C) (2006) grants bankruptcy courts unconstitutional
authority).
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predicted its decision would not result in sweeping changes. 75
Nevertheless, a broad rationale combined with limiting language
.allows for both broad and narrow interpretations.
Many courts have approved of Safety Harbors narrow reading
of Stern. 76 In an order denying a motion to withdraw reference,
the Middle District of Florida's Chief Judge Anne C. Conway
cited Safety Harbor positively. 77 The Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the
Southern District of Florida, the Honorable Paul G. Hyman, cited
Safety Harbor throughout an order that overruled an objection to
a bankruptcy court's adjudicating a fraudulent transfer action. 78
In the Southern District of New York, Judge Scheinlin also cited
Safety Harbor, among other decisions, in support of her argument
that Stern has not been given an "expansive effect." 79 In less than a
year, Safety Harbor has been cited in more than twenty decisions in
at least seventeen separate districts. Many courts have agreed that
Judge Williamson provided a compelling interpretation of Stern in
Safety Harbor. 80
In the post-Stern world, districts across the country have adjusted
local procedures. For example, Chief Judge Conway amended the
Middle District of Florida's standing order of reference on February
22, 2012. 81 It directed bankruptcyjudges to enter proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law if they conclude they do not have
constitutional authority to enter a final judgment. 82 Additionally,
Chief Judge Conway's order explicitly allows the district court
to treat final orders issued by the bankruptcy court as proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 83 Other districts have issued

75

76
77
78

79
80
81
82
83

See id. at 2620 ("We do not think the removal of counterclaims such as [the
debtor's] from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully changes the division
of labor in the current statute .. .. ").
See, e.g., In re Connelly, No. 11-03315-KRH, 2012 WL 1098431 , at *6 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2012).
In re Land Resource, LLC, No. 6:11-cv-1808-0rl-22 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2012).
See In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R 901, 905-06, 908, 910 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2011) (citing Safety Harbor, 456 B.R 703, 715, 717, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011), for several points and holding the Internal Revenue Service consented
to bankruptcy court jurisdiction).
See In re Extended Stay, Inc., 466 B.R 188, 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See, e.g., In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011).
In re Standing Order of Reference Cases arising Under Title 11 , United States
Code, 6:12-mc-26-0rl-22 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2012).
See id.
See id.
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similar standing orders of reference. 84 These steps may diminish
the impact of a broad reading of Stern because district judges
can more efficiently administrate bankruptcy courts' incorrect
rulings. But even before these changes, Judge Williamson's pointby-point examination of Stern presented an insightful, accurate
interpretation. These district-wide changes evidence courts'
recognition that Stern's fallout must be managed carefully.
In this author's opinion, part of that management must
include a jurisprudential choice because applying Stern broadly
at the bankruptcy-court level could create a systemic problem. To
understand how narrow applications of Stern facilitate appellate
review, it is necessary to understand how Stern objections will arise.
A bankruptcy judge faces a discrete set of choices when
presented with a particular matter for adjudication. The bankruptcy
judge may issue a final order85 or propose findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court. 86 Like the orders of all
Article I courts, every bankruptcy order has two distinct analyses:
the threshold question of constitutional authority and the merits
of the issue.
For an appellate court to hold whether the bankruptcy
court applied Stern correctly, the bankruptcy court must enter
final judgment. If a bankruptcy judge issues a final order and it
is appealed to the district court, the district judge can affirm the
order, remand for additional proceedings, or reverse and enter
its own order. If a bankruptcy judge proposes findings of fact and
conclusions of law, no Stern issue will be in the record because the
district court will have entered final judgment. An appellate court

84

85
86

See In re Standing Order of Reference Re: Title 11 (D. Del. Feb. 29, 2012)
("The district court may treat any order of the bankruptcy court as proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the event the district court concludes
that the bankruptcy judge could not have entered a final order or judgment
consistent with Article III."); In re Standing Order of Reference Re: Title 11 ,
o. 12 Misc. 00032 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 1, 2012) (same).
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Theoretically, bankruptcy judges
could also abstain based on the principles of federal court abstention. The
abstention doctrine is the idea that courts will not hear a case for a particular
reason, usually involving deference to a different court's authority. See, e.g., R.R.
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). These concepts do not cover the
relationship between district courts and bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy courts
could abstain based on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c), but this would also leave entry of
a final order for the district court.

Published by STARS, 2013

11

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 14

312

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

cannot evaluate the bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority if
the final order is entered by the district court not the bankruptcy
_court. The issue would not be properly before the court. For this
reason, interpreting Stern in bankruptcy courts too broadly may
deprive appellate courts of the opportunity to review the issue.
Judge Williamson's interpretation of Stern is more than just
intellectually honest. It also preserves issues for appeal and allows
Article III courts to declare bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction in light
of Stern. From North Carolina87 to Hawaii, 88 Safety Harbor has been
used to bolster and inform discussions of Stern. 89 As an article in
the Florida Bar Journal aptly observed, "Tampa Bankruptcy Judge
Michael G. Williamson grappled with some of the issues raised by
Stern v. Marshall and seems to have put the decision in its proper
.
,,go
perspectlve ....

87
88
89

90

See In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc. , 466 B_R. 750, 767, 771 (Bankr.
M.D . . C. 2012).
See In re The Mortgage Store, Inc. , 464 B.R. 421, 425 (D. Haw. 2011) (quoting
Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 717).
See, e.g., In re Ambac Fin. Group, Inc. , 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011)
("This is the correct view of Stern v. Marshall and of the Court's jurisdiction
and constitutional authority in this case."); In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC,
No. 09-14547, 2011WL5417098, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2011); In re
Direct Response Media, Inc., 466 B.R. 626, 645 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
Roberta A. Colton & Stephanie C. Lieb, Is Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction in Flux
Because of Anna Nico/,e Smith?, FLA. BJ., Jan. 2012, at 39.
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